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fOOD. DRUG. AND COSMETIC LAW
FREDERICK l\f:. HART

HE Food Additive Amendment of 1958 clearly stands out as the
T principal
legislative achievement during the S11rvey period, while
the Supreme Court's decision in the Florida Citrns case offers the
most important judicial development.
I
FEDERAL LEGISLATION1

Food Additives Amendment of 1958.-Characterized as "the
most important advance of our national pure food law, in its entire
Food Additive Amendment of 19583 is the result of
history," 2
over seven years of legislative investigation, hearings, and debate.4
Essentially, the amendment requires pretesting by industry of potentially unsafe food additives before their use.
When the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938:1 was
passed, no specific provisions were included regulating food additives
either than coal-tar colors.6 Most additives used at that time had been
long recognized as safe and suitable for use in food, and scientific
e~perimentation had not as yet demonstrated the harmful effects possible from some of these apparently innocuous added substances.
During and subsequent to World War IT, however, amazing progress
was made by the food and chemical industries in developing antioxidants, emulsifiers, stabilizers, preservatives, flavors, and other additives designed to better foods. Concurrent to this development,
improved scientific testing methods and greater scientific knowledge
cast doubt upon the safety of certain food additives.T

the·

F.rederick M. Hart is Assistant Professor of Law and Director of the Food Law
~rogram at 1'1ew York University School of Law. He is a Member of the District of
Columbia and New York Bars.
1 For other recent enactments not discussed in the te.'tt see Li\'estock Marketing and
Meat-Packing Industry Act, 72 Stat. 1749, 7 U.S.C.A. § 227 (Supp. 1958) (jurisdiction
of Federal Trade Commission e."l:tended to stockyard activities) ; Humane Methods of
Slaughter Act, 72 Stat. 862, 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 1903-06 (Supp. 1958) (providing for human~
method of livestock slaughter).
2 Dunn, Fundamental Progress of the Pure-Food Law, 13 Food Drug Cosm. L.J.
615, 616 (1958).
3 72 Stat. 1784, 21 U.S.C.A. § 348 (Supp. 1958).
4 See Kleinfeld, Congress Investigates Chemicals in Foods, 6 Food Drug Cosm.
L.J. 120 _(1951).
5 52 Stat. 1040 (1938), as amended, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1952).
6 52 Stat. 1046 (1938), 21 U.S.C . .§ 342(c) (1952); 52 Stat. 1049 (1938), as
amended, 21 U.S.C. § 346(b) (1952).
7 See H.R. Rep. No. 2356, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1953); H.R. Rep. No. 3254, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1951).
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Under the 1938 act, regulation of additives was possible only
through the enforcement of provisions which prohibited the addition
to food of any poisonous or deleterious substance except where it was
unavoidable in good manufacturing practices. Where good manufacturing practices required the use of a toxic substance, the Food and
Drug Administration was empowered to establish tolerances, setting
the maximum amount of the additives which could be used.8
This method of control was unsatisfactory for three reasons:
( 1) it required the Government to prove affirmatively that the added
substance was poisonous or deleterious, proof of which might require
two years of scientific testing; (2) during this period of testing the
manufacturer was permitted to continue using the product, and allowed to offer it to consumers; and ( 3) the act, as interpreted, absolutely prohibited any unnecessary poisonous or deleterious substance
to be added, thus keeping from the market some additives which, although toxic if taken in large quantities, might be used at safe levels
to the advantage of the consumer.
In general, the Food Additive Amendment follows the traditional
administrative procedure. All additives which are not generally recognized among qualified experts to be safe under the conditions of
intended use, or which are not within certain exempt classes, render
a food adulterated9 unless there is in effect a regulation issued by the
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare prescribing the conditions under which the additive may be safely used.10 Any person may
file a petition proposing the issuance of such a regulation. 11 In support
of his application, adequate scientific evidence must be presented
proving the additive safe under the intended conditions of use. 12
Within ninety days ( which time limit may be extended by the
Secretary to a maximum of one hundred and eighty days), the Secretary must promulgate an order ruling upon the petition.13 Up to
s 52 Stat. 1046 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(2) (1952); 52 Stat. 1049 (1938) 1 as
amended, 21 U.S.C. § 346(a) (1952). Some degree of regulation was also afforded by
sections of the act providing for the standardization of foods. 52 Stat. 1046, 21 U.S.C.
§ 341 (1952). See Atlas Powder Co. v. Ewing, 201 F.2d 347, 2 CCH Food Drug Cosm.
L. Rep. U 7247 (3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 923 (1953); Lovell, Administrative
Procedure in the Regulation of Food Additives: A Comparative Study, 11 Food Drug
Cosm. L.J. 413 (1956).
o 52 Stat. 1046 (1938), as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 342(c) (1952).
10 21 U.S.C.A. § 348(a) (Supp. 1958).
11 21 U.S.C.A. § 348(b) (Supp. 1958).
12 Although the Food and Drug Administration apparently will not foreclose the
use of new tests to prove safety, the present method of testing requires extensive experimentation usually taking in excess of two years. See Lehman, Procedures for
the Appraisal of the Toxicity of Chemicals in Foods, Drugs and Cosmetics, 10 Food
Drug Cosm. L.J. 679 (1955).
13 21 U.S.C.A. § 348(c) (Supp. 1958).
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this point there is no hearing procedure available, but anyone who is
adversely affected by the order may, within thirty days of its promulgation, file objections and request a hearing. H His request must
be accompanied by a specification of the parts of the order to which
he objects, and reasonable grounds for his objection. The Secretary
is then required to hold a public hearing, after notice, for the purpose
of receiving evidence relevant and material to the issues raised by the
objections. At the completion of the hearing an order ruling upon
the objections must be made, including detailed :findings of fact and
conclusions.15
This order is then subject to judicial review in the United States
courts of appeal upon the petition of any adversely affected person.
The scope of review to be applied by the court is indicated by the
provision in the act that, "the findings of the Secretary with respect
to questions of fact shall be sustained if based upon a fair evaluation
of the entire record at such hearing.mo That Congress intentionally
refrained from using the phrase "substantial evidence" in formulating
the scope of judicial review is apparent from the legislative history of
the amendment, wherein it is indicated that an attempt was made to
establish other guideposts for the reviewing courts. 17 Considering,
however, the lack of success which judges have had in reducing the
well-known "substantial evidence" test to a working formula, 18 it is
unlikely that food additive regulations will receive any different review from that given cases arising under statutes requiring an agency
to base its determination upon substantial evidence. No matter how
legislatures may phrase the "test" for sustaining agency action, judges
will still be left with wide discretion, and will be greatly influenced by
the character of the agency, the nature, consequences, and fairness of
the initial ruling, and by their own competence to decide the issues
raised.
The legislative history of this amendment shows many instances
of sharp disagreement among those most interested in its adoption.
The Food and Drug Administration, consumer organizations, and
industry representatives each sponsored and backed different schemes
for governmental control in this field. The bill which was finally
enacted into law is, in a sense, a compromise designed to satisfy, at
least partially, each of these parties. However, in a more real sense,
21 U.S.C.A. § 348{f) (Supp. 1958).
21 U.S.C.A. § 348(£) (Supp. 1958).
21 U.S.C.A. § 348(g) (Supp. 1958).
S. Rep. No. 2422, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1958); Legislath-c ffistory of 1958
Food Additives Amendment to Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 66 (Dunn ed.
1958).
18 See Cooper, Administrative Law: The "Substantial Evidence" Rule, 44 A.B.A.J.
945 (1958).
14
15
10
11
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it is an amalgamation of the best of the many suggestions offered.
The result is a strong bill for consumer protection which gives broad
powers to the Food and Drug Administration while still being consistent with a philosophy of government which favors industry initiative and responsibility over governmental licensing.
II
MUNICIPAL LEGISLATION

During the year New Yoi;k <;ity rewrote those provisions of its
Health Code which regulate foods, drugs, and cosmetics.10 A part of
a general revision of the code, these regulations are of special importance due to the probability that they will become model provisions
influencing other municipalities restudying the problem. A major
objective of the revision was to conform the language of the local
regulations to the applicable federal and state law in order to allow
greater cooperation among enforcement officers, and to relieve industry of the burden of having to comply with conflicting regulations. As
a result, the New York, City regulations now closely follow the Federal
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, with the exception that the city has
deleted all provisions aimed at economic fraud, on the rationale that
this situation is more adequately handled by the state and federal government, and q.oes not constitute a health problem.20

III
CASES 21

Coal-Tar Colors.-In 1955 FD & C Red No. 32 was removed
from the approved list of coal-tar colors by the Secretary of Health,
New York City Health Code, tit. IV, arts. 70, 71, 111, 113,
Introduction to 3d Draft of Articles 70, 71, 111 and 113 presented by Legislative
Drafting Research Fund of Columbia University to The Board of Health of the City
of New York (mimeo.). This draft was approved in principle by the board on October
20, 1958. , .
.
21 Other cases decided since the 1957 Survey, but not discussed in the text, include:
Marshall v. United States, 258 F.2d 94, 2 CCH Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. ,r 7446 (10th
Cir.), cert. granted, 358 U.S. 892 (1958) (actions by government agents held not to
constitute en~rapment) ; United States v. Miller, 256 F.2d 89, 2 CCH Food Drug Cosm,
L. Rep. ,r 7442 (8th Cir. 1958) (writ of mandamus t9 compel district court to omit
part of judgment denied) : United States v. 1500 Cases, More or Less, 249 F.2d 382
(7th Cir. 1957) (pre-seizure storage charges not recoverable from federal. governmc"O;
United States v. Rutstein, 163 F. Supp. 71, 2 CCH Food Drug Cosm, L. Rep. U 7443
(S.D.N.Y. 1958) (labelling requirement of § 407(b} held not to apply to ,vholes:ile
packages); United States v. 42 Jars ... "Bee Royale Capsules ***," 160 F. Supp. 818,
2 CCH Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. II 7438 (D.N.J. 1958) (prior adjudication under
postal fraud statute held not res judicata in seizure action) ; United States v. 3963
Bottles, More or Less, 2 CCH Food Drug Cosm. L, Rep. U 7460 (N.D. Ill. 1958)
(agreement between claimant and Post Office Departm,ent in fraud action held not ap·
plicable to seizure action) ; United States v. Delmar Pharmacal Corp., 2 CCI-1 Food
Drug Cosm. L. Rep. 11 7456 (N.D.N.Y. 1958) (consent degree in injunction, action) ;
10
20
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Education, and Welfare.22 The validity of this delisting order was
sustained against a general attack by the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit,23 but was set aside by the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth -Circuit insofar as it removed certification of the color as harm1.e_ss and safe for external use on oranges.24 The Fifth Circuit, in a
confusing opinion, held that the term "harmless11 in the statute2 :1 was
to be const~ed in a relative sense, and that the Secretary was required
t-0 certify a color whenever it was harmless under the conditions of its
intended use. The court also held that it was incumbent upon the
Secretary to determine whether the color was necessary in good production practices, .and if it were, he was required to promulgate tolerances within which the color could be safely used.
Certi~rari was granted in the Fifth Circuit case, Folsom v. Florida _Citrus Exclzange,26 and the Supreme Court reversed.21 Considering the legislative history of. the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938,28 the Court concluded that Congress, intending to
treat coal-tar colors (which add only to the appearance of a food)
with greater caution than other toxic ingredients, had dictated that
"the test of. certification ... concentrates on the color substance itself
[which] is to be listed only if it is harmless."20 In interpreting the key
word "harmless," the Court said that "Congress may have intended
'harmless' in a relative sense, but we think it was in relation to such
labpratory tesu; [toxicological tests] as the ones the Secretary performed."30 From _a literal reading .of the statute, the Court found
no grounds for th~ contention that the Secretary is empowered to set
tolerances for the use of coal-tar colors.
It is likely that the opinion will result in legislation e.xtending
the stay of the Secretary's order, effected by a congressional amendUnited States v. w; F. Morgan & Sons, 155 F. Supp. 40, 2 CCH Food Drug Cosm. L.
Rep. U 7421 (E.D. Va. 1957) (proof insufficient to establish violation of oyster standards).
- 22 20 Fed. Reg. 8492 (1955). For the present approved list see 21 C.F.R. ti 9.3
(1955):
'
23 Certified Color Indus. Comm. v. Folsom, 236 F.2d 866, 2 CCH Food Drug Cosm.
L. Rep. U 7367 (2d Cir. 1956).
24 .Florida Citrus Exchange v. Folsom, 246 F.2d 850, 2 CCH Food Drug Cosm.
L: Rep; U 7404 {5th Cir. 1957).
25 52 Stat.-1049 (1938), as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 346(b) (1952).
26 356 U.S. 911 (1958).
21 Fleming v. Florida Citrus Exchange, 358 U.S. 153, 2 CCH Food Drug Cosm. L.
Rep. U 7468 (1958).
28 52 Stat. 1040 (1938), as amended, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1952).
29 358 U.S. at 162, 2 · CCH Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. at p. 8603. For a fuller discussion of the circuit ·court opinions see 33 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 302, in 1957 Ann. Sur..-cy
Am. L. 263 {1958), wherein it was stated, "the clear language of the stntutc contradicts
the fifth circuit's interpretation. The section directs that the color must be safe, not
the use to which it might be put."
30 358 U.S. at 164, 2 CCH Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. at p. 8604.
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ment to the Act in 1956, specifically allowing the use of the color on
oranges until April of 1959.31
Physician's Dispensing Drugs Without A Prescription.-In
Brown v. United States,32 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
held that the Durham-Humphrey Amendment33 to the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act34 applied to the sale of prescription drugs by
a registered physician. Doctor Brown dispensed barbiturates in one
thousand pill lots to federal agents posing as truck drivers, without
giving them a prescription, or examining them to ascertain whether
the use of these drugs was therapeutically indicated.·
The court refused to refer to the legislative history of the amendment on the grounds that the law had been interpreted to be for the
benefit of the public on several occasions by the Supreme Court. 8G
Literally construing the language of the statute to require a prescription prior to the dispensing of drugs, even by a physician, the court
found the trial judge's charge to the jury unobjectionable. The trial
judge had charged that:
... in determining whether he [defendant) dispensed the drugs ... on
prescription, you may properly consider whether a doctor-patient relationship existed ... whether he considered the individual needs of the
person to whom he dispensed the drug, the quantity of the drug dis·
pensed and the manner in which he supervised the use of the drug. 80

This charge, the court felt, placed the doctor in a better position than
he would be in if the statute were taken on its face.
Although the court specifically held the charge correct, a close
reading of the case gives the impression that the court actually held
that whenever a physician dispenses drugs covered by section 503 (b ) 37
of the act, he is technically violating the law. It is as difficult to conceive that Congress intended such a result as it is to believe that a
physician, by virtue of his being a physician, is to be allowed to
engage in the uncontrolled retail sale of restricted drugs. The more
realistic approach was taken by the trial court in instructing the
jury that a physician is exempt from the act only so long as he acts
as a medical doctor.
Relabeling of Condemned Drugs.-The United States filed a
70 Stat. 512 (1956), as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 342(c) (Supp. V, 1958).
250 F.2d 745, 2 CCH Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. U 7425 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
356 U.S. 938 (1958).
33 65 Stat. 648 (1951), 21 U.S.C. § 353(b) (1952).
34 52 Stat. 1040 (1938), as amended, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1952).
35 The court cited United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689 (1948); United States
v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
36 250 F.2d at 747, 2 CCH Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. at p. 8509.
37 65 Stat. 648 (1951), 21 U.S.C. § 353(b) (1952).
31
32
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libel asking condemnation of a "skin conditioner" on the ground,
inter alia, that the name of the preparation, "buticaps," caused it to
be misbranded because it represented to the public that the product
had a therapeutic effect, when in fact it did not. The claimant admitted. that the articles were misbranded on other grounds charged
in the complaint, but denied the allegations as to the name. Judgment
was given to the Government on the pleadings, but the court released
the goods to the claimant for relabeling under the supervision of the
Food and Drug Administration. Thereafter, the claimant moved for
an order that since there had been no judicial determination that the
name did not comply with the statute, they had the right to continue
the use of this name. This motion was denied by the district court.
The court of appeals, in Buticaps, Inc. v. United Statcs,38 reversed,
holding that the terms and conditions of salvage are to be set by the
court, not by the Food and Drug Administration, and that the failure
of the court to give claimant a hearing on the issue would be a deprivation of due process.
Mu/.tiple Seizures of New Drugs.-Merritt Corp. v. Folsom:3 9 is
interesting on two grounds. First, it held that multiple seizures may
be instituted without the making of any probable cause determination
under section 304.40 Secondly, the case furnishes the first judicial
recognition that, "where there is a genuine difference of medical
opinion among the experts on the question of whether a drug is generally recognized as safe for the treatment of a particular disease, it
must be concluded that the drug is not generally recognized as safe for
use in the treatment of that disease," 41 and that, hence, it is a new
drug under section 20l(p).42
38 252 F.2d 634, 2 CCH Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. !I 7432 (D.C. Cir. 1958). Con~
United States v. 1322 Cans, More or Less, of Black Raspberry Puree, 68 F. Supp. SSL
(N.D. Ohio 1946).
39 165 F. Supp. 418, 2 CCH Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. !I 7462 (D.D.C. 1958).
40 52 Stat. 1044 (1938), as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 334 (1952).
41 165 F. Supp. at 421, 2 CCH Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. at p. 8583.
42 52 Stat. 1041 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 32l(p} (1952).
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